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POST TRUSTEESHIP ENVIRONMENTAL
ACCOUNTABILITY: CASE OF PCB
CONTAMINATION ON THE MARSHALL
ISLANDS
HYUN S. LEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the conclusion of World War II, the newly formed United Na-
tions sought to aid in the autonomous development of the newly liber-
ated peoples in Africa and Micronesia. This entailed the establishment
of a system of trusteeship states to be administered by members of the
United Nations until the beneficiaries of these trusts were ready to take
the reins of governance into their own hands. Along with the develop-
ment of autonomous systems of government, the trustees also sought to
aid in the trust territories' economic development. In doing so, the trus-
tees were basically given free reign in administering the trust territo-
ries.
Tragically, this lack of accountability for their actions in the trust
territories led to a number of haphazard environmental practices
among the trustees. Subsequently, the former trust territories were left
with a number of ecological disasters to deal with. Economically unable
to deal with these issues by themselves, the governments of the former
trust territories requested that those who created these situations be
accountable. However, they were often faced with a great deal of resis-
tance by the former trustees.
A number of these ecological issues were raised by the former trus-
tee states with the trustees. None of these suits have actually been re-
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solved through an adjudication which would have established some sort
of legal precedent on the matter. Rather, the parties have all negoti-
ated settlements wherein the former trust territories contract away
rights to further claims against the trustees. In light of the non-
resolution of some of these issues, the question still exists as to whether
a fiduciary relationship exists between the trustees and the former
trust territories such that they are liable for ecological harm.
In 1986, the United States terminated its trustee relationship with
its former trust territories by entering into the Compact of Free Asso-
ciation. Presently, the former portion Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands consisting of the Marshall Islands are an independent country,
the Republic of the Marshall Islands. While it still retains close ties
with the United States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands is an
autonomous state. However, the environmental consequences of the
trusteeship era still linger. The United States has agreed to compen-
sate the RMI for the harm caused to the various atolls by atomic testing
during the Cold War. Another ecological threat still remains, the more
subtle threat of PCB contamination. PCB's represent a more subtle,
but also harmful threat, to the people of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands. It is uncertain whether the RMI can afford to pay for this
clean up on their own. To its credit, the United States has cleaned up
one of these PCB sites, it has not accepted legal accountability. Thus,
the issue still remains whether former trustees owe a duty to their for-
mer trusts to clean up for past contamination.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Republic of the Marshall Islands is located in the South Pacific
Ocean in the region known as Micronesia. The Marshall Islands consist
of approximately "thirty-four coral islands and atolls with a total land
area of approximately 180 square kilometers and a population of about
43,000."1 It has been speculated that the Micronesian region of the Pa-
cific Ocean was settled by human inhabitants some time between 3,000
and 5,000 B.C.2 Spain claimed Micronesia in 1565.3 This year marked
a pivotal point in Micronesia history. The Europeans who first colo-
nized Micronesia entered the venture with the mentality that they were
civilizing ignorant savages. 4 This mind-set prevailed in Spanish coloni-
1. Jean Zorn, The Republic of the Marshall Islands, in SOUTH PACIFIC ISLANDS
LEGAL SYSTEMS 102 (Michael A. Ntunmy ed.,1992).
2. Id. at 100.
3. Id.
4. The sixteenth century theologian and jurist Francisco de Vitoria stated that:
[a]lthough the aborigines in question are ... not wholly unintelligent, yet
they are little short of that condition, and so are unfit to found or administer
a lawful State up to the standard required by human and civil claims .... It
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alism until the end of the Spanish Empire. It can be argued to have
survived even through the days of the League of Nation Mandate Sys-
tem and the United Nations Trusteeship System. From the date that
Europeans arrived there, the Micronesian islands and its peoples would
be traded back and forth from one empire to another.
By the nineteenth century, Micronesia would be visited by mari-
time traders from around the world.5 It was during the era of steam
ship travel that Micronesia really became the focus of imperialist atten-
tion. This was the era where Alfred Thayer Mahan's theories of mari-
time empires based on re-fueling stations spread throughout the world
came to life. Micronesia represented a crucial link between Europe, the
Americas and Asia. This was also the time when the German Empire
and the British Empire began to dispute Spain's claims to Micronesia. 6
The lands and peoples of Micronesia were never perceived by Europe-
might, therefore, be maintained that in their own interests the sovereigns of
Spain might undertake the administration of their country, providing them
with prefects and governors for their towns and might even give them new
lords so long as this was clearly for their benefit. I say there would be some
force in this contention; for if they were all wanting in intelligence, there is
no doubt that this would not only be a permissible, but also a highly proper,
course to take; nay our sovereigns would be bound to take it, just as if the
natives were infants.
Antony Anghie, The Heart of My Home: Colonialism, Environmental Damage and the
Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 445, 491-92 (1993) (quoting FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE
INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI REFLCETIONES 161 [On the Indians Lately Discovered] (Ernest
Nys ed. & J.P. Bate trans., The Carnegie Inst. of Washington 1917) (1696). See also
TZVETAN TODOROV, THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA: THE QUESTION OF THE OTHER (Richard
Howard trans., 1984).
5. Zorn, supra note 1, at 100.
6.
Britain was not overly anxious to acquire new colonies but could not at the
same time permit the unopposed expansion of German influence in what was
now perceived to be a vital area of the globe. A compromise had to be
reached and at a Conference in Berlin in 1886 the two empires drew an arbi-
trary line dividing the Pacific into two great spheres of influence-the British
and the German. The map drawer, who may have never seen [the region he
was demarcating], ran his pen through the little stretch of 250 kilometers of
water which separated Nauru from its nearest neighbor .... There was
nothing unusual in such map drawing activities. The great powers had
grown accustomed to the idea that the rest of the world was there to be di-
vided up for their own benefit. Portions of the world had been carved up be-
fore and this was the era when the great partition of Africa took place at the
Congress of Berlin in 1885 and that continent was cut into portions shared
out among the colonial powers. The welfare of the people populating the ar-
eas through which the fine pen of the cartographer ran was certainly not the
most important consideration in the exercise.
CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY, NAURU, ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE UNDER INTERNATIONAL
TRUSTEESHIP 6 (1992).
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ans thought of as independent nations with living and breathing human
inhabitants with unique cultural assets worth preserving, but merely as
strategic assets on a global chess board. Even in the nineteenth cen-
tury, there was still the Eurocentric racist notion that had engrained
itself into international law that only "only European states were fully
sovereign[; and] Non European states [ ] existed outside the realm of
the law and thus could not legally oppose the sovereign will of the
European states. '7 Given this mind set, it is not surprising the attitude
of the European conquerors who conquered Micronesia, and then traded
the land and the people as though they were chattel.
After Spain lost the "Spanish American War" to the United States,
it sold its possessions in Micronesia to the German Empire for $4.5 mil-
lion in 1886.8 German occupation of Micronesian Islands only lasted
until World War 1.9 Once World War I began, Japan declared war on
Germany and annexed German possessions in Micronesia, including the
Marshall Islands. 10 At the end of World War I, the League of Nations
created a system of mandates out of the former territories of the Ger-
man and Ottoman Empires.
The League of Nations established a number of basic principles to
guide its members in the administration of the Mandate Territories.
One of the most fundamental of the guiding principles of the League of
Nations was that the administrators of a Mandate were in the position
of maintaining a trust. In Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of
Nations it proclaimed,
[t]o those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late
war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which for-
merly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern
world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and de-
velopment of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that
securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this
Covenant.11
Thus those members of the League of Nations that accepted a
Mandate made a covenant with each other and the inhabitants of the
Mandate that the interests of the inhabitants of the Mandate were to be
considered a sacred trust. The League of Nations Mandate System,
where states entrusted with a Mandatory were to act on behalf of the
7. Anghie, supra note 4, at 493-94 (citing THOMAs LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1895)).
8. CARL HEINE, MICRONESIA AT THE CROSS ROADS 13 (1974).
9. RON CROCOMBE, ET AL., POLITICS IN MICRONESIA 84 (1983).
10. HEINE, supra note 8, at 14.
11. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 1.
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League of Nations, was the first time that international accountability
was implemented. 12
The League of Nations divided the former German and Ottoman
territories into three classes of Mandates: Class A Mandates,' 3 Class B
Mandates' 4 and Class C Mandates. 15 In 1920, Japan was granted the
Class C Mandate of the "former German Pacific Islands," including the
Marshall Islands.16 Under the Japanese mandate, the Marshall Islands
were subjected to intense economic development as a result of large-
scale Japanese immigration. 17 By 1935, Japan had begun constructing
military bases on its Class C Mandates.' 8 Subsequently, by the begin-
ning of World War II when Japan left the League of Nations, the ma-
jority of the population in the Marshall Islands Class C Mandate was
Japanese.' 9
Believing the December 7, 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
had been launched from the Marshall Islands, the United States en-
tered World War II "determined that Micronesia would never again
pose a security threat to the United States."20 After a long and bloody
engagement in the Pacific, the United States ended World War II with
the detonation two nuclear bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At
the end of the hostilities, the United States replaced the Japanese Em-
pire's military presence in Micronesia as the regional power. On a
global scale, the United States had a tremendous amount of influence in
shaping the post war global reality. Subsequently, the United States
made it a priority to neutralize Micronesia as a strategic threat to the
United States.
At the end of World War II, the United Nations replaced the
League of Nations. It replaced the League of Nations Mandate System
12. CHARMIAN TOUSSAINT, THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED NATIONS 11-12
(1956).
13. Class A Mandates consisted of former Turkish territories (Lebanon, Transjordan,
Syria, Iraq and Palestine) which were autonomous but subject to assistance by a manda-
tory power "until such time as they are able to stand alone." Francis B. Sayre, Legal Prob-
lems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System, 42 AM. J. INT'L. L. 263, 264
(1948) (citing LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 4).
14. Class B Mandates were former German territories in Central Africa "not yet
ready for self government." Id. at 264.
15. Class C Mandates included South West African as well as all of the German Pa-
cific colonies: those territories which the Allies doubted would ever be able to stand alone.
Id. (citing LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para 6).
16. See Larry Wentworth, The International Status and Personality of Micronesian
Political Entities, 16 ILSA J. INT'L. L. 1, 3 ( 1993).
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing JOHN McNEIL, THE STRATEGIc TRUST TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 25 (1976)).
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with the International Trusteeship System. As in the League of Na-
tions Covenant, the nation states that accepted a UN Trusteeship ac-
cepted a sacred trust to promote the well being of the inhabitants of the
Trust. It recognized the need to respect the cultures of the peoples of
the Trusts. The U.N. Charter recognizes that the interests of the in-
habitants of the newly created Trust territories are "paramount." It
also requires the members of the United Nations who accept the Trus-
teeship responsibility to acknowledge the acceptance of a "sacred trust
obligation" whose beneficiaries are the Trust Territory's inhabitants.
This system should have been the means to achieve the noble aspiration
of self determination originally articulated in the League of Nations.
The United Nations Trusteeship System should have served to give life
to the noble spirit of the United Nations Charter and to create an ave-
nue to achieve those noble aspirations articulated decades before in the
League of Nations.
In light of the newly emerging Cold War and the heavy price paid
in World War II, national security and strategic interests prevailed in-
stead. Within the United Nations Charter, there was a provision that
permitted the creation of "Strategic Trusts."21  "The administering
authority of a strategic trust was able to exercise more control over the
territory than a non-strategic trust. The Trusteeship Agreement that
the United States negotiated with the United Nations Security Council
allowed the United States to deploy its military forces in Micronesia,
establish military bases, and to close off areas for security purposes."22
This device granted the Trustee a great deal of latitude in the admini-
stration of the Trust Territory. 23
The terms of the Trusteeship and the Strategic Trust would be gov-
erned by the individual Trusteeship Agreement. In its relationship
with the Marshall Islands, the United States had extensive powers in
administering the Trusts.24 Article 3 of the Trusteeship Agreement
21. "There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas
which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, with-
out prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43." U.N.
CHARTER art. 82.
22. Wentworth, supra note 16, at 7.
23. As the U. N. CHARTER states:
It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust
territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer
forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the
obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the
administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of
law and order within the trust territory.
U.N. CHARTER art. 84.
24.
In discharging its obligations under Article 76(a) and Article 84 of the Char-
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stated that,
[t]he administering authority shall have full powers of administration,
legislation and jurisdiction over the territory subject to the provisions
of this agreement, and may apply to the trust territory, subject to any
modification which the administering authority may consider desir-
able, such of the laws of the United States as it may deem appropriate
to local conditions and requirements.25
The United States had ultimate authority over the terms of the
agreement in that it had to approve any modifications to the Trustee-
ship agreement.261n the end, the United States had near complete do-
minion over how it would administer the Trust territories placed in its
care. The United States had the entire area comprising the Marshall
Islands, the Carolina islands and the Marianas, composing an area of
846 square miles designated a "Strategic Trust."27 The United States
used several atolls in the Marshall Islands as "Ground Zero" for ther-
monuclear detonation experimentation. The very first of these hydro-
gen bomb experiments took place on Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Is-
lands in 1946.28 The experiments that took place in 1946 were referred
to as "Operation Crossroads." 29  The following year on December 2,
ter, the Administering Authority shall ensure that the Trust Territory shall
play its part, in accordance with the Charter of United Nations, in the main-
tenance of international peace and security. To this end, the administrating
power shall be entitled: 1) To establish naval, military and air bases and to
erect fortifications in the Trust territory; 2) To station and employ armed
forces in the Territory; and 3) To make use of volunteer forces, facilities and
assistance from the Trust territory in carrying out the obligation towards the
Security Council undertaken in this regard by the Administrating Authority
as well as for the local defense and maintenance of law and order within the
Trust Territory.
Trusteeship Agreement For the Former Japanease Mandated Islands, 1947, 8 U.N.T.S.
189, 192.
25. Id. at art. III.
26. "The terms of the present Agreement shall not be altered, amended or terminated
without the consent of the Administrating Authority." Id. art. XV.
27. Emanuel Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64
YALE L.J. 629, 630 (1955).
28. Id.
29.
The first test, code named Able, took place on July 1, 1946. The Army Air
Force dropped the atomic bomb from a B-29 Superfortress at an altitude of
30,000 feet. The bomb was detonated 519 feet above the Bikini Lagoon's sur-
face, which contained the Navy's target fleet of ninety-five ships. The explo-
sion was enormous and created the now familiar mushroom cloud, which
climbed to 20,000 feet. The bomb released explosive energy equivalent to
23,000 tons of TNT. As a result of the Able bomb, five target ships sank.
The second test, code named Baker, took place on July 25, 1946, about three
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1947, the Atomic Energy Commission announced that Enewetak Atoll
would be the "proving ground" for future atomic weapons tests. 30 The
Atomic Energy Commission justified its choice of Enewetak Atoll and
the resettlement of its inhabitants, on the basis that it had the fewest
inhabitants and "it [was] isolated and there [were]hundreds of miles of
open seas in the direction in which winds might carry radioactive parti-
cles. 13 1 Operation Crossroads forced the evacuation of the Bikinians
from their ancestral homes to Kili Island. 32
In 1954, the Marshallese people made an urgent plea to the United
Nations to stop the next round of hydrogen bomb experiments. In their
petition, the Marshallese people described the subject of their petition
as a "Complaint regarding the explosion of lethal weapons within our
home islands."33 In this petition, the Marshallese emphatically stated
that:
[W]e, the Marshallese people feel that we must follow the dictates of
our consciences to bring forth this urgent plea to the United Nations,
which has pledged itself to safeguard the life, liberty and the general
weeks after the Able test. The bomb was suspended at a depth of 90 feet be-
low the Bikini lagoon surface. Once detonated, the explosion created an
enormous dome of water that rose nearly a mile into the sky. The explosion
also created an underwater shockwave and gigantic waves that caused se-
vere damage to many target ships and the islands .... Despite warnings, the
Baker test went ahead as scheduled. As [predicted, [sic] all target ship, as
well as the Bikini lagoon, were heavily contaminated by radioactive materi-
als.
Major Timothy J. Saviano, Book Review, Operation Crossroads the Atomic Tests at Bikini
Atoll, 145 MIL. L. REV. 193, 194 (1994).
30. Margolis, supra note 27, at 631.
31. Id. (quoting The Atomic Energy Commission Press Release No. 70, Dec. 1, 1947).
32.
mo stage the testing of atomic bombs at Bikini, the United States had to up-
root 167 islanders from their homeland. In return, they were promised that
the United States would care for them during the testing and then return to
Bikini Atoll. Unfortunately as [Jonathan M. Weisgall] noted [in his book
Operation Crossroads-the Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll] the islanders be-
came 'nuclear nomads' as the United states moved them several times.
Although the Bikinians were fisherman, they were eventually resettled on
Kili, a small island that had neither a lagoon nor sheltered fishing ground.
In 1952, conditions became so bad on Kili that the United States had to air-
drop emergency rations on the islands. Because of the radiation levels at Bi-
kini, the islanders were not allowed to return home until 1969. On their re-
turn they were shocked to see how mush the Atoll had been destroyed or
damaged by the bombs.
Saviano, supra note 29, at 195.
33. Petition from the Marshalese People concerning the Pacific Islands, U.N. Doc. No.
T/Pet. 10/28 (1954)[hereinafter Petition].
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well being of the people of the Trust Territory, of which the Marshal-
lese people are a part.
The Marshallese people are not only fearful of the danger to their per-
sons from these deadly weapons in case of another miscalculation, but
they are also very concerned for the increasing number of people who
are being removed from their land.
Land means a great deal to the Marshallese. It means more than just
a place where you can plant your food crops and build your houses; or a
place where you can bury your dead. . .It is the very life of the people.
Take away their land and their spirits go also.
The Marshall Islands are all low coral atolls with land area where food
plants can be cultivated quite limited, even for today's population of
about eleven- thousand people. But the population is growing rapidly;
the time when this number will be doubled is not far off.
The Japanese had taken away the best portions of the following atolls;
Jaluit, Kwajalein, Enewetak, Mills, Malcelap and Wetje to be fortified
as part of their preparation for the last war, World War II. So far, only
Imedj Island on Jaluit Atoll has been returned to its former owners.
For security reasons, Kawajalein Island is being kept for the military
use. Bikini and Enewetak were taken away for atomic bomb tests and
their inhabitants were moved to Kili Island and Ujelang Atoll respec-
tively. Because Rongelab and Uterik are now radio-active, their in-
habitants are being kept on Kwajalein for an indeterminate length of
time. 'Where next?' is the big question which looms large in all of our
minds. 34
Tragically, the hydrogen bomb experiments continued. Subse-
quently, the Marshallese islands of Rongelap and Utrik were irradiated
and its people were deprived of their ancestral homes. Beginning in the
late 50's, the Micronesians began to exercise some influence on the ad-
ministration of the Trust Territories. The Congress of the Marshall Is-
lands created in 1949, was reorganized into a new unicameral legisla-
ture in 1958, giving special seats to the traditional chiefs known as Iroij
laplap. 35 In 1965, the Congress of Micronesia was established as a ter-
ritory wide bicameral legislative body.36 In 1967, it established the Po-
litical Status Commission to negotiate with the United States about
34. Id.
35. Zorn, supra note 1, at 100.
36. Id.
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administration of the Trust Territory. 37 This resulted in the establish-
ment by the Nijitela (the Marshallese Legislature) of their own separate
Political Status Commission to negotiate with the United States about
the administration of the Marshall Islands. 38
The first substantive steps towards Marshallese independence be-
gan in 1977 with the convening of the Marshall Islands Constitutional
Convention.39 This led to the Hilo Principles in 1978, establishing free
association as the basis for future relations with the United States.40
The Marshallese eventually adopted their own Constitution in 1979.41
The principles of free association established in 1978 led to fruition in
1982 with the signing of the Compact of Free Association, ending the
Trust territory relationship between the United States and Micronesia.
Presently, the days of the Trusteeship System are over. The Mar-
shallese have a nation of their own, the Republic of the Marshall Is-
lands. Their relationship with the United States is one of "free associa-
tion," governed by the Compact of Free Association. 42  With the
ratification of this document, almost forty years of U.S. administration
of the Marshall Islands as a Trust Territory ended.43 Although the offi-
cial Trust relationship between the United States and the Marshallese
is over, the legacy of the past still lingers today. To its credit, the
United States has accepted financial accountability for some of its ac-
tions in the past.
III. THE PROBLEM OF PCB CONTAMINATION
A. The Leaking Transformers
During the Trust administration, the United States Department of
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Cf. Territories and Insular Possessions, 48 USC 1681 (1998), et seq.
43.
The Compact of Free Association set forth in title II of this joint resolution
between the United States and the Government of the Marshall Islands of
the Palau is hereby approved, and Congress hereby consents to the subsidi-
ary agreements as set forth .... Don April 9, 1986, as they relate to such
Government. Subject to the provisions of this joint resolution, the resident is
authorized to agree, in accordance with section 411 of the Compact, to an ef-
fective date for and thereafter to implement such Compact, having taken
into account any procedures with respect for termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement.
Id. at Title I, § 101.
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Defense and the Department of Interior, the two agencies mandated by
the United States government with the administration of the Marshall
Islands, brought electrical transformers to the Marshall Islands to de-
velop a power system.44 Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) were used in
transformers as insulation because of their longevity, their durability,
non flammable nature and stability.45 Under United States law, as of
1977 PCB's were no longer permitted to be imported or manufactured in
the United States.46 When these, PCB carrying, transformers were
brought to the Marshall Islands is unclear. However, the threat they
represented to the Marshallese people was.
Some of these hazardous transformers were buried and abandoned
on atolls in the Marshall Islands.47 A number of the sites where used
transformers had been abandoned were discovered to be leaking PCBs
into the soil and water.48 It is unclear how many of these PCB sites ex-
ist undiscovered. A number of transformer sites were found on Jauit,
Ebi, Enewetak and Bikini Atoll, with the largest being on Majuro. 49
The E.P.A. tested the soil these transformer sites for P.C.B. contamina-
tion. The results varied from no PCB contamination of the soil to some
PCB contamination of the soil.5o The sizes of the PCB carrying trans-
formers varied from smaller 30 to 50 gallon containers to larger 1,000
gallon containers.51 Consequently, the magnitude of contamination or
potential for contamination varied from site to site. At one site in Jaluit,
the E.P.A. dealt with the problem of PCB contamination using a method
of treatment known as cement fixation, where cement was poured into
the soil to immobilize future PCB seepage movement. 52 At a site in
Majuro, the PCB concentration was not terribly high but action was
still required. Thus, E.P.A. capped the contaminated site with a 40 by
44. Marshall Islands Seek Superfund Money to Clean Up PCBs Left by US Govern-
ment, BNA INT'L ENVTL. DAILY, Sept. 8, 1993. [hereinafter Marshall Islands].
45. THEO COLBURN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE 89 (1996).
46.
(2)(A)... no person may manufacture, process, or distribute in commerce or
use any polychlorinated biphenyl in any manner other than in a totally en-
closed manner... (C) For the purposes of this paragraph, the term 'totally
enclosed manner' means any manner which will ensure that any exposure of
human beings or the environment to a polychlorinated biphenyl will be in-
significant as determined by the Administrator by rule.
15 U.S.C. § 2605 2(A) & (C) (1998).
47. Marshall Islands Seek Superfund money to Clean UP PCbs Left by U.S. Govern-
ment, BNA INT'L. ENVIRONMENTAL DAILY (Sept. 8, 1993).
48. Telephone Interview with Holly Barker, Spokeswoman, Embassy of the Republic
of the Marshall Islands [hereinafter Barker].
49. Telephone Interview with Norm Lovelace, Director, Pacific Insular Area Pro-
grams, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region IX [hereinafter Lovelace].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
409
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60 foot concrete slab. 53 Generally, any transformer at a PCB site that
had a concentration of higher than 500 parts per million of PCB in it
was treated and shipped off island to the United States for disposal at a
licensed disposal facility.5 4 Throughout the clean up process of the
known transformer sites, the E.P.A. encountered administrative diffi-
culties in that a number of the problematic transformers had been from
one site to another. Subsequently, the E.P.A. had to re-identify and re-
assess the site before beginning the removal process. 55
Unlike the long and complex process involved in a standard Super-
fund clean up,56 the E.P.A. was able to move relatively quickly by des-
ignating the clean up as an emergency removal.57 Throughout the clean
up process, the E.P.A. consulted with the government of the RMI in a
cooperative agreement. The first major transformer sites were cleaned
up by the United States Environmental Protection Agency.58 According
to Norm Lovelace of E.P.A. Region IX, this was done as a good faith
measure, not as a legal obligation.59 One of the reasons for the rela-
tively quick and efficient clean up of these PCB contaminated sites was
the informal, but personal, relationships between the various actors
from the Marshallese government and the United States. By avoiding
the various formalities in official proceedings, the people involved were
able to devote important time and resources to cleaning up the PCB
contamination. 60 The United States E.P.A. has also taken measures to
instruct local authorities on how to deal with future clean ups. 61 How-
ever, the issue of liability in the context of future disposal of newly dis-
covered PCB contamination is still unresolved. 62 Holly Barker, a
spokesperson from the Republic of the Marshall Islands Embassy in
Washington, D.C., stated that new leaking transformers are uncovered
after every major storm blows through the islands. 63 Another batch of
transformers was discovered recently on Kawajalein Atoll.64 Thus, the
problem of PCB contamination still exists as a very real threat to the
human environment in the Marshall Islands.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1998), et seq.
57. Lovelace, supra note 49.
58. Telephone Interview with Jorelik Tibon, Republic of the Marshall Islands Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency.
59. Lovelace, supra note 49.
60. Barker, supra note 48.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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B. The Harm Caused by PCBs
The true potential for harm the presence of these abandoned trans-
formers represent to the Marshallese people cannot be understood
without some understanding of the nature of PCB's. PCB's, while
harmful in nature, do not kill instantaneously like cyanide. Rather,
their effects are felt in a more subtle and less easily detectable manner.
Dioxins, such as PCB's:
[A]ffect the thyroid system in diverse, complex, and as yet incompletely
understood ways. Some analyses indicate they may mimic or block
normal hormone action perhaps by binding to the thyroid receptor.
Other data suggest they may even increase the number of receptors
present to receive the hormone signals. They also seem to act particu-
larly on T4, the form of thyroid hormone that is critical to prenatal
brain development. 65
As a hormone mimic or block, PCB's will disrupt biological devel-
opment at a cellular level. Normally:
[h]ormones and their receptors fit together with a "lock and key"
mechanism. Under normal conditions, a natural hormone binds to its
receptor and activates genes in [a cell's] nucleus to produce the appro-
priate biological response. Hormone mimics can also bind to the recep-
tor and induce a response, but prevent natural hormones from attach-
ing to the receptor. Certain synthetic chemicals released into the
environment can behave like hormone mimics and hormone blockers,
contributing to disruption of cellular activity. The compound that out-
numbers or completely out competes for receptor sites determine the
response by the cell. 66
Thus a hormone mimicker or blocker will manifest itself in the form
of damaged reproductive systems, altered nervous system and brains,
and impaired immune systems. 67
The threat of PCB's is not isolated to the disruption of cellular de-
velopment. Rather, as one of the most persistent of dioxins, it has a
tendency to effect an entire eco system. PCBs move up through the food
chain, beginning in soil that is absorbed by plants then consumed by a
herbivore that is then eaten by an organism higher on the food chain
and eventually working its way to human consumption. By the time it
is consumed by a human being, the concentration level of PCB in the fat
cells will have increased dramatically.
65. Colborn, supra note 45, at 187.
66. Id. at 72.
67. See id. at 172.
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C. PCB Contamination on the Marshall Islands
During its trip up the food chain, each organism acquired through
consumption all the PCBs stored in the fat cells of its meal. 68 Subse-
quently, PCBs will manifest themselves in the soil, the ground water,
the surface waters, the vegetation, the animal life and human life
wherever it is present. In a small eco system such as the atolls of the
Marshall Islands, where there is little escape for this persistent sub-
stance, the level of exposure concentration in the environment will be
higher. Thus, the Marshallese will be subject to more exposure path-
ways through which PCBs can enter their bodies. Therefore, a more
thorough remediation will have to be effected in contaminated areas.
Until a remediation takes place those lands that have absorbed the
leaking transformer PCBs will be potentially harmful to human health.
Thus, the Marshallese will be deprived of the use of land that is par-
ticularly valuable given the small amount of land that comprises their
nation. The Marshallese recognize that their population is growing and
that this will be problematic in light of the geographic reality that the
Republic of the Marshall Islands is made up of a number of small atolls.
As articulated in their 1954 petition to the U.N.,
[]and means a great deal to the Marshallese. It means more than just
a place where you can plant your food crops and build your houses; or a
place where you can bury your dead... It is the very life of the people.
Take away their land and their spirits go also.6 9
The PCB contamination of their lands will not only physically im-
pair the ability to efficiently utilize their lands, depriving them of valu-
able land that could be used for farming or housing, but it may also
strike at the heart of their culture. To people who have lived on small
delicate atolls dating back thousands of years, the deprivation of the
use of certain lands may have significantly detrimental cultural effects.
The potential for harm from these PCB leaking transformers is
clear. The source of this pollution is also clear. These transformers
were brought to the Marshall Islands by the United States to develop a
power system on the islands. There was no malevolent intent on the
part of the United States in this action. In all likelihood, the United
States was acting quite benevolently in aiding in the development of an
energy infra structure on the Marshall Islands. However, the fact of
the matter is that in the process of developing this energy infra struc-
ture, the United States government left behind a number of transform-
ers that have leaked their hazardous contents. While the United States
68. See id. at 87-109.
69. Petition, supra note 33.
VOL. 26:3
1998 POST TRUSTEESHIP ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY 413
Government has taken measures to clean up the first PCB site, it has
acknowledged no liability. It has also been speculated that there are
other sites in the Marshall Islands with aging transformers that may
begin or have already started to leak their hazardous contents into the
soil or waters of the Marshall Islands. The question that remains to be
resolved is whether there is a future duty on the part of the United
States government that brought these transformers to the Marshall Is-
lands, or by any of the other Trustees who polluted the Trust they were
administrating, to rehabilitate their former Trust. Answering this
question will entail an examination of the provisions of the UN Charter
establishing the Trusteeship System, the terms of the Trusteeship
Agreement between the United States and the UN Security Council,
other international agreements such as the Stockholm Declaration and
the UNCED Declarations, International Custom and actions that may
be the basis for establishing a new custom of international affairs.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. International Environmental Law
The general body of International environmental law is unclear on
whether liability attaches to a state that causes injury to another state
through past actions that are not violations of international law nor in-
ternational custom. Generally, most international environmental
agreements are prospective in nature. They seek to prevent present
and future environmental harm. All discussions of international envi-
ronmental harm and liability begin with the Trail Smelter case between
the United States and Canada. 70 The Trail Smelter Arbitration in-
volved claims brought by the United States against Canada for damage
to U.S. residents' property by sulfur dioxide emissions from a Canadian
smelting operation in British Columbia. The Trail Smelter Arbitration
tribunal ruled that:
[u]nder the principles of international law, as well as the law of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its ter-
ritory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the terri-
tory of another State or the properties or persons therein, when the
case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence. 71
This ruling became, what is known today, as the "Polluter Pays"
70. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada), 3 U.N. REP. INT'L ARBITRATION
AWARDS 1911 (1941).
71. Id. at 1965.
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principle in international environmental law. Some international legal
scholars have suggested that the Trail Smelter Arbitration ruling
stands for the proposition that liability should not be based on fault, but
something closer to strict liability.7
2
B. Strict Liability Based Regime
International agreements have established the imposition of abso-
lute liability for harm resulting from certain activities such as space ac-
tivities. 73  The Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects provides that "[a] launching State shall be ab-
solutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space ob-
ject on the surface of the earth o to aircraft in flight."74 This imposition
of absolute liability is rooted in the traditional notion that parties en-
gaging in potentially ultra hazardous activities should be absolutely li-
able for any harm. It stands as recognition that with the great ad-
vances in technology within the last fifty years, human beings have
begun to engage in activities that entail the use of materials that are
more potentially harmful and volatile.7 5 Applied to the facts of the PCB
contamination on the Marshall Islands, the importation of transformers
for the purpose of developing a power system for the Marshallese can-
not reasonably be considered an ultra hazardous activity that would
carry strict liability consequences with it.
C. Wrongfulness Based Liability Regime
The World Commission on Environment and Development has ad-
vocated a liability scheme based on wrongfulness rather than one
based on strict liability.7 6 In Article 21 of the Brundtland Report, it
states that "[a] state is responsible under international law for a breach
of an international obligation relating to the use of a natural resources
or the prevention or abatement of an environmental interference. '" 77
Under this wrongfulness based approach, the responsible state would
72. Constance O'Keefe, Transboundary Pollution and the Strict Liability Issue: The
Work of the International Law Commission on the Topic of International Liability for Con-
sequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 145, 175-76 (1990) (quoting Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive De-
velopment of International Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1189, 1227 (1965)).
73. Convention on International Liability for the Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter Convention].
74. Id. art II.
75. O'Keefe, supra note 72, at 187-89.
76. Id. at 192.
77. Id. at 191 (quoting WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,
EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw REPORT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 32 (1986)).
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be required to, "a. cease the internationally wrongful act; b. as far as
possible re-establish the situation which would have existed if the in-
ternationally wrongful act had not taken place; c. provide compensation
for the harm which results from the internationally wrongful act; d.
where appropriate, give satisfaction for the internationally wrongful
act."7
8
Applied to the facts surrounding the PCB contamination of the
Marshall Islands, it is uncertain whether, at the time of their importa-
tion, the United States was even aware of the potential harm that PCBs
could cause. Nor is it clear whether anyone knew at the time of the im-
portation of the transformers that PCBs were a toxic substance. It is
entirely possible that the transformers were perceived as being benefi-
cial goods that were being imported for the benefit of the Marshallese.
Therefore, it is uncertain, based on the scientific knowledge at the time,
whether the United States could be found to have been negligent in im-
porting the PCB carrying substances into the Marshall Islands. Thus, a
reasonable argument could be formulated that the United States did
not act negligently in importing PCB laden transformers to the Trust
Territories and cannot be found liable under a wrongfulness based li-
ability scheme.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the United States could be held liable
for the clean up of the PCB contamination of the Marshall Islands
based on a strictly state to state analysis of transboundary environ-
mental harm.
In the case of the Marshall Islands and the other former Trust Ter-
ritories of the Pacific Islands, there was not a state to state relationship
between them and the United States. Rather, it was a special one in
which the United States, due to its position as a pre-eminent world
power, enjoyed special privileges in its administration of the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands. In this relationship, the inhabitants of the
Trust Territory were dependent on the United States as the adminis-
trator of the trust to act in good faith. The United Nations Charter
which created the International Trusteeship System and granted the
United States the administration of the former Japanese Mandated Is-
lands, also imposed a fiduciary duty upon the United States to admin-
ister the trust for the ultimate benefit of these inhabitants. In adminis-
trating the trust territory, the United States had full powers of
administration, legislation and jurisdiction.7 9 As a result of the unequal
nature of this relationship, it can be argued that the fiduciary obliga-
tion imposed a higher standard and longer enduring duty of care upon
the United States in its administration of its Trust Territories.
78. Id.
79. Convention, supra note 24, art. III.
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V. THE UN CHARTER & THE INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM
A. The International Trusteeship System
The United Nations International Trusteeship System was created
to replace the former League of Nations Mandate System. The Interna-
tional Trusteeship System was one in which member states of the
United Nations were entrusted with the administration of territories
inhabited by people who had not achieved self governance.8 0 In Article
73 of the United Nations Charter, "the member states who assumed the
responsibility of administering a trust acknowledged was a sacred trust
the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of interna-
tional peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-
being of the inhabitants of th[e] territories ... ," 81 The roots of this
principle of the sacred trust can be traced to the writings of Edmund
Burke 1783 where he stated that the trusteeship principle in colonial-
ism was one in which there must be a degree of accountability by the
trustees for their actions.8 2 This regulatory element of colonialism was
also embedded in the League of Nations Mandate System where it
stated that "there should be applied the principle that the well-being
being and development of peoples [colonies and territories of the de-
feated nations from World War I not yet able to govern themselves] for
a sacred trust of civilization. '8 3 The notion of this sacred trust was one
of the corner stones of the International Trusteeship System.
The International Trusteeship System was established by the
United Nations to administer and supervise those territories placed un-
der the system by individual agreement.8 4 The "basic objectives" of the
International Trusteeship System echoed those Purposes of the United
Nations stated in Article 1.85 The "basic objectives" of the International
Trusteeship System were:
a. to further international peace and security;
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advance-
ment of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive
development towards self-government or independence as may be ap-
propriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peo-
80. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
81. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
82. TOUSSAINT, supra note 12, at 6 (citing HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY vol.
123 (1783)).
83. Id. at 10 (1956) (quoting LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 2).
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 75.
85. U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
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ples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as
may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to
encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the
world; and
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial mat-
ters for all members of the United Nations and their nationals, and
also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice,
without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and
subject to the provisions [in the trusteeship agreements] .86
In looking at the express language of Article 76, it appears that the
objectives of the International trusteeship System was to primarily
benefit the international community rather than the Trust territories'
inhabitants.8 7 However, when looked at from the broader perspective of
Chapter XI and Chapter XII, including the article 73 provisions on "Non
Self Governing territories," it becomes apparent that the well being of
the inhabitants of the trust territories is indeed a priority.88
B. Comparison to League of Nations Mandate System
Unlike the League of Nations Mandate System, the Trusteeship
System was not limited by geography nor to defeated parties of the
most recent war.8 9 The International Trusteeship System had a broader
scope of parties that could be placed underneath its supervision than its
predecessor, the League of Nations Mandate system. Whereas the
League of Nations Mandate System applied to former territories of de-
feated states from World War I and those peoples not able to govern
themselves,90 the International Trusteeship System had a much
broader scope. Under the International Trusteeship System, trust ter-
ritories could be territories held under a mandate, territories formerly
belonging to defeated states of World War II and states voluntarily
placed under the trusteeship by the administering state.91 The Interna-
tional Trusteeship could not accept as a trust territory a nation already
a member of the United Nations.92 The terms under which the territory
86. Id.
87. TOUSSAINT, supra note 12, at 55.
88. Id. at 53.
89. Id. at 3.
90. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22.
91. U.N. CHARTER art. 77, para. 1.
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 78.
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would be placed under the International Trusteeship System and how it
would be administered were to be specified in the individual Trustee-
ship Agreements. 93
C. The Trusteeship Agreements
The Trusteeship Agreements were to specify "the terms under
which the trust territory will be administered and designate the
authority which will exercise the administration of the trust terri-
tory. '94 The terms of the Trusteeship Agreement were to be agreed
upon "by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power
in the case of territories held under Mandate," and approved by the
United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.95 In essence,
the Trusteeship Agreement was to be the legal foundation for the ad-
ministering authority's administration of the trust territory. 96 However,
should a conflict arise between the individual trusteeship agreement
and the United Nations Charter, the terms of the Charter will prevail. 97
Within each trusteeship agreement, the administering authority
may designate a strategic area(s) that could include "part or all of the
trust territory."9 8 The terms of the trusteeship agreement leading to
the designation of the strategic trust were to be approved by the United
Nations Security Council. 99 The basic objectives of article 76 of the
United Nations Charter referring to the International Trusteeship Sys-
tem were applicable to strategic trusts as well.10 0 Under article 84 of
the United Nations Charter, the administering authority had the duty
to ensure that the trust territory was to contribute to the maintenance
of international peace and security. 10 1 This entailed the authorization
of the administering authority to "make use of volunteer forces, facili-
ties, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obliga-
tions towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the
administering authority."'102 The designation of a strategic area permit-
ted the administering authority broader discretion in the administra-
tion of the trust territory.
93. U.N. CHARTER art. 77, para. 2.
94. U.N. CHARTER art. 81.
95. U.N. CHARTER art. 79.
96. TOUSSAINT, supra note 12, at 95.
97. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
98. U.N. CHARTER art. 82.
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 83.
100. Id.
101. U.N. CHARTER art. 84.
102. Id.
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D. The Role of the Trusteeship Council
The United Nations Trusteeship Council was the primary mecha-
nism to assist the United Nations General Assembly in the supervision
of the administering of the trust territories.10 3 The Trusteeship Council
was to consist of member states administering trusts, the fifteen per-
manent members of the Security Council and members of the United
Nations elected to the councill o' 4 The elected members of the Trustee-
ship Council were to act as a balancing factor to ensure an equal num-
ber of UN member states that were administering trusts and not ad-
ministering trusts were represented on the Trusteeship Council. 0 5
One of the major functions of the Trusteeship Council was to "for-
mulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educa-
tional advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory."'0 6 In
carrying out this function to evaluate the administering authority's ad-
ministration of the trust territory, the Trusteeship Council was to
consider reports submitted by the administering authority; accept peti-
tions and examine them in consultation with the administering
authority; provide for periodic to the respective trust territories at
times agreed upon with the administering authority; and take these
and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship
agreements. 0 7
In that respect, the UN Trusteeship Council can be contrasted with
the League of Nations Mandate System which did not avail itself of in-
spections of mandates because it would offend the sovereignty of the
administering authority.1l 8 Thus the UN Trusteeship Council served as
an information intermediary between interested parties and the U.N.
General Assembly. Based on the information collected and submitted
under Article 87, the Trusteeship Council was to submit recommenda-
tions to the U.N. General Assembly. 10 9 In this role, the Trusteeship
Council limited to making non binding recommendations to members. 110
Subsequently, the effectiveness of the UN Trusteeship Council was reli-
ant upon the good faith practices of the administering authorities."'
103. U.N. CHARTER art. 85.
104. U.N. CHARTER art. 86.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. U.N. CHARTER art. 87.
108. ToUSSAINT, supra note 12, at 180.
109. Id. at 152.
110. Id. at 174.
111. Id.
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VI. STATE OF LAW DURING THE TRUSTEESHIP
Pursuant to Article Three of the "Trusteeship Agreement for the
Former Japanese Mandated Islands," "[t]he Administering authority
shall have full powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction
over the Territory. 112 Although officially sovereignty lay elsewhere,
this Trusteeship Agreement had the practical effect of granting the
United States sovereign authority over the trust territory. 113 By desig-
nating the Trust Territory a Strategic Trust, the United States was re-
sponsible to the Security Council, where the United States had veto
power, for its administration of the Trust Territory. 114
The United States agency mandated with administering the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands was the United States Department of In-
terior.1 15 The executive authority in the Trust Territory was vested in
the High Commissioner who was appointed by the President with ad-
vice and consent of the Senate.11 6 Legislative authority was vested in
the Congress of Micronesia who were elected by the citizens of the Trust
territory. 17 However the Congress of Micronesia was curtailed in its
legislative authority in that it could not enact legislation that was "in-
consistent with the laws of the United States applicable to the trust
Territory, treaties or international agreements of the United states, Ex-
ecutive Orders of the President or orders of the Secretary of Interior. 118
Furthermore, any legislation enacted by the Congress of Micronesia
could be vetoed by the High Commissioner. However this veto could be
overridden by two thirds of the majority of both houses of the Congress
of Micronesia (Senate and House of Representatives), subject to the ul-
timate veto of the United States Secretary of Interior. I" 9 Although the
United States exercised direct control of areas of regulation such as
foreign affairs, "the daily administration of the islands has largely
shifted into the hands of the local government. The Territory operates
under its own comprehensive legal code. Inhabitants of the islands are
citizens of the Territory, not of the United States.12O However, other
Courts have found that as a result of its veto authority, "the United
States exercises a maximum degree of control which is inconsistent
112. Convention, supra note 24, art. III.
113. People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645, 653 (D. Haw. 1973).
114. Id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 27).
115. Id. (construing Exec. Order No. 11021, 27 Fed. Reg. 4409 (1962)).
116. Id. at 655 (quoting 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (Supp. 1973)).
117. Id. (citing Department of Interior Order No. 2918, pt. III §§ 1,2,5,7 and 8 (Dec. 27,
1968)).
118. Id. (citing Department of Interior Order No. 2918, pt. III §§ 2 (Dec. 27, 1968)).
119. Id. (citing Department of Interior Order No. 2918, pt. III § 13 (Dec. 27, 1968)).
120. Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d 583, 588 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
1004 (1975).
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with the assertion that the Trust territory is a foreign country... there
does not appear to be have been any significant delegation of authority
to the citizens of the Trust Territory.
121
While the Trust Territory did have its own legislature that enacted
its own legislation. This was subject to U.S. approval. Although the
United States exercised full powers of administration, legislation and
jurisdiction over the Trust Territory, 122 federal legislation did not auto-
matically apply there.1 23 Congress was required to "manifest an inten-
tion to include the Trust Territory within the coverage of a given stat-
ute before the courts will apply its provisions to claims arising there."
124
A number of U.S. laws have been ruled to have applicability in the
Trust Territories through the definition of the term "State"125 and
"United States"' 26 to include the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
In these statutes, the act specifically includes the Trust territory of the
Pacific Islands as being within the scope of the legislation. Thus, cer-
tain U.S. laws do have extraterritorial application in regulating U.S. ac-
tivities abroad. However, it is unclear whether U.S. environmental
regulatory standards applied to the disposal of the PCB leaking trans-
formers in the Marshall islands. While the Solid Waste Disposal Act
does not include the former Trust territories within its definition
"states,"'127 the Toxic Substances Control Act does include "any other
territory or possession of the United States"'128 within its definition of
"State." The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act also includes "any other territory or possession over
which the United states has jurisdiction" within its scope.' 29 Thus it
can be argued that the former trust territories fall within the scope of
the statute through its use of the "any other territory" language.
The RMI has argued that section 105 (h) of the Energy Policy Act of
1992 mandates the United States use money from the Superfund to
clean up the PCB contamination there. Section 105 (h) of the Energy
Policy Act states that "the programs and services of the Environmental
protection Agency regarding PCBS shall, to the extent applicable, as
121. People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645, 655 (D. Haw. 1973).
122. Convention, supra note 24, art. III.
123. See People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 814 (D. Haw. 1973).
124. Id.
125. See id. (citing inter alia 42 U.S.C. § 4571; 41 U.S.C. § 48(b); 42 U.S.C. § 247(b); 47
U.S.C. § 397; 42 U.S.C. § 4402(3); 42 U.S.C. § 2949; 20 U.S.C. § 1401; 42 USC 300(a); 7
U.S.C. § 135 et seq.; 33 U.S.C. § 1362; 42 USC § 229(b); 42 U.S.C. § 3890; 20 U.S.C. § 403;
42 U.S.C. 298(b); 20 U.S.C. § 807; 20 U.S.C. § 807; 33 U.S.C. § 1169; 42 U.S.C. § 4601).
126. See id. (citing inter alia 33 U.S.C. § 1163; 42 U.S.C. § 2949; 22 U.S.C. § 2127; 33
U.S.C. § 1161; 15 U.S.C. § 633; 16 U.S.C. § 633; 16 U.S.C. § 951).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(31) (1988).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(13) (1988).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(27) (1988).
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appropriate, and in accordance with applicable laws be construed to be
made available to such islands. 130 Since the enactment of this provi-
sion, the United States Environmental Protection Agency has cleaned
up a number of the PCB sites using Superfund money. The United
States has stated that the remediation of the PCB sites was not an ac-
ceptance of liability, but merely acts of good neighborliness.
VII. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP'S
Article 75 of the United Nations Charter established the Interna-
tional Trusteeship System mandated with the development of the trust
territories.1 31 The major objectives of the International Trusteeship
System were "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their pro-
gressive development towards self government or independence. '"1 32
The U.N. Charter required the members that accepted the administra-
tion of a trust to recognize that "the interests of the inhabitants of these
territories are paramount 133 and to accept that responsibility as "a sa-
cred trust the obligation [of which] to promote to the utmost.. .the well-
being of the inhabitants of these territories."'1 34 Thus the United States
as the administrator of the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
of which the Republic of the Marshall Islands was formerly a member,
accepted the obligation to promote the interests of the Marshallese.
This principle was never in dispute.
Unlike the Former League of Nations Mandates which were to be
administered as integral portions of the controlling state, implying a
lesser duty to the Mandate's inhabitants,1 35 article 73 of the UN Char-
ter obligates the Trustee to make the interests of the inhabitants of the
Trust Territory paramount. 136 This obligation is clearly indicative of
the existence of a fiduciary duty of loyalty between the administering
trustee to the inhabitants of the trust territory.137
The existence of a fiduciary duty commands the trustee to "act for
the benefit of the other while subordinating one's personal interest."'138
130. The Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2781.
131. U.N. CHARTER art. 75.
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
134. Id.
135. Ramon E. Reyes, Nauru v. Australia: The International Fiduciary Duty and the
Settlement of Nauru's Claims for Rehabilitation of its Phosphate Lands, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 40 (1996) (citing Ellen M. Fitzgerald, Note: Nauru v. Australia: A Sa-
cred Trust Betrayed?, 6 CONN J. INT'L L. 209, 215 (1990)).
136. Reyes, supra note 135, at 37(citing U.N. CHARTER art. 73).
137. Id. at 39.
138. Id. at 35 (citing BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990)).
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This duty commands the trustee "not [to] exert or pressure on the bene-
ficiary, [not] deal with the subject matter of the trust as to benefit him-
self or prejudice the beneficiary, or take advantage of the relation-
ship."1 39 Thus, the United States was bound by this fiduciary duty in
its administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Despite
the permissibility provided for in the UN Charter articles establishing
Strategic Trusts1 40 , the United States was clearly acting outside the
scope of its duty by detonating hydrogen bombs on the trust itself, irra-
diating it and making it unusable for some time. However, it is unclear
whether the fiduciary duty extends so far as to require the trustee to
rehabilitate lands contaminated during the trust administration after
the trust has been terminated.
In resolving this issue, it will be useful to look at how other legal
systems view a trust in establishing the parameters of a trustee's du-
ties. Legal cultures such as "the civil law, the Judaeo-Christian tradi-
tion, Islamic law, socialist law, African customary law and the non the-
istic traditions of Asia and South Asia,"141 "have recognized that each
generation is a trustee or steward of the natural environment for the
benefit of generations yet unborn."142 Under United States law, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the inhabitants of a trust can sue to enforce
their treaty rights. 143 During the trusteeship period, the Trusteeship
Agreements clearly created substantive rights and duties. 44
VIII. TRUSTS
A. U.S. Trusts
1. Commonlaw Trusts
Under U.S. commonlaw principles, a fiduciary relationship is one in
which a party entrusted with property is legally bound to maintain
property for the benefit of another. 145 In a trusteeship there is the set-
tlor who intentionally created trust, the trustee is the maintainer of the
139. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990)).
140. U.N. CHARTER arts. 83-84.
141. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 6, at 338 (citing E.B. WEISS, IN FAIRNESS To FUTURE
GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL
EQUITY 18-19 (1989)).
142. Id.
143. People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't. of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 96 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
144. Michael W. Leslie, International Fiduciary Duty: Australia's Trusteeship Over
Nauru, 8 B.U. INT'L L. J. 397, 408 (1990).
145. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS §1.1 (6th ed. 1987).
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trust, the trust property itself and the beneficiary for whose benefit the
trust property is held by the trustee. 146 The beneficiary is required to
place a great deal of trust in the trustee because the trustee has greater
control over the trust than the beneficiary. 147 Consequently, the trustee
owes a duty of loyalty to the beneficiary wherein he must act with strict
honesty 148 and must act solely in the interests of the beneficiary when
maintaining the trust. 149
2. U.S. Trust Relationship with Native American Peoples
Historically, the United States has exercised a trusteeship relation-
ship with the Native American peoples of North America. This rela-
tionship has been characterized as one in which a "domestic dependent
nations" exists within the boundaries of a sovereign state.150 All native
peoples in the United States, including those in Hawaii and Alaska suf-
fered a "common loss of land and resources to an immigrant majority
population with colonialist impulses.'' In the relationship between
the United States and the Cherokee Nation, the Cherokee were placed
under the protection of the United States which also had the exclusive
right to regulate trade with them and "manag[ed] all their affairs as [it]
thought proper."' 52 It is a relationship in which the Cherokee are "so
completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States,
that any attempt to acquire their lands [by foreign nations], or to form a
political connection with them, would be considered by all as an inva-
sion of [United States ] territory."'153 It has been characterized by Chief
Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1831 as one that "re-
sembles that of ward to his guardian."'15 4
The trust relationship between the Native American peoples and
the United States is one in which the United States provides has a fi-
duciary duty to "protect the tribes' property, treaty rights and way of
life." 15 5 This trust relationship is one of the fundamental principles un-
derlying the relations between the United States and the Native Ameri-
can peoples. 5 6 It represents an enforceable legal acknowledgment by
146. Id. at §1.1.
147. Id. at §1.2.
148. Id. at §1.2.
149. Id. at § 95, at 340.
150. Cherokee Nation v. U.S., 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
151. Mary Christina Woods, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the
Native Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administra-
tion's Promises and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733, 742 (1995).
152. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Woods, supra note 151, at 735.
156. See id. at 743.
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the United states that it has taken what once belonged to the Native
American peoples and now agrees to protect what they still retain.
157 It
stands as a judicially created doctrine and "stands independent of trea-
ties and inures to the benefit of all tribes, treaty and non treaty
alike."' 58 It binds federal agencies to deal with the tribes in "the most
exacting fiduciary standards" when carrying out their various statutory
mandates. 159 Federal agencies are bound not to, "abrogate or extin-
guish the trust relationship, or violate the treaty rights, though courts
still allow Congress such plenary power. Absent a direct conflict be-
tween an applicable statutory provision and the trust responsibility, a
federal agency must implement its program in a manner that protects
tribal lands and resources."'160
Within the United States, the trusteeship relationship between the
United States and the Native American peoples is an enforceable one
with substantive obligations. Tragically, the United States government
has been unable to significantly deter the ecological degradation that
has severely damaged tribal lands and resources to such a degree that
it is uncertain whether these cultures will ever be able to recover from
this harm. 161 Looking at the Northwestern United States as an exam-
ple, mismanagement of the Columbia River by the state and federal
government have led to the devastation of the salmon population and
the subsequent desolation of the fisheries for which the local Native
American peoples were dependent on for their economic and cultural
survival. In that respect, the United States can be said to have failed in
its trusteeship obligations to "protect tribal lands, resources and native
way of life from the intrusions of the majority society."'162 Applied to the
principles of commonlaw trusts, the United States can reasonably be
argued to have been negligent in its management of the body of the
trust.
B. The Civil Law System
Under the Civil Law System, which has its roots in Ancient Roman
157. See Woods, supra note 151, at 742 (citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316
U.S. 286, 296 (1942)); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 244-248 (1983); Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256-257 (D.D.C. 1973) (mem),
modified on other grounds, 360 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd in part on other grounds,
499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert denied. 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Northern Cheyenne Tribe
v. Hodel, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3065, 3070-3071 (D.
Mont.) (May 28, 1985).
158. Id. at 742.
159. Id. at 743 (quoting Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 297; Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
of Indians, 354 F. Supp at 256).
160. Id. at 744.
161. Id. at 745.
162. Id. at 742.
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Law, there exists the mandatum. 163 In a mandatum, there is a manda-
tory, who like a trustee, "is entrusted with the goods of a principal and
is under a legal duty to account faithfully and honestly in regard to his
custody of those goods."164 Another similarity to the modern trust is
that "the mandatory.. .may not benefit from the mandate except to the
extent that [the terms of the mandate]specifically entitles him to such
advantage." 165 Within the French legal system, where there is no dis-
tinction legal and equitable estates, the closest legal device to the com-
monlaw trust is the tutelle. 166 A tutelle is a legal institution used to
provide an unemancipated child who has lost both parents with a
tuteur (guardian or tutor).167 The tutelle who is entrusted with custody
of the unemancipated child "is responsible for the child's maintenance,
education, estate and all 'acts of law." '168 Unlike a commonlaw trust,
the tutelle has a built in oversight component referred to as a conseil de
famille (family council). 169
C. Non European Legal Systems
Besides the European legal societies, other legal cultures have also
embraced devices similar to the commonlaw trust. In each of these
trust like devices there is a recognition that individual actions do not
take place in a complete vacuum and thus consideration must be given
to one's actions on the greater whole.
In Islamic law, there is a trust like device known as the wakf. The
historical roots of the wakf are said to date back to Mohammad when he
mandated his followers to "[i]mmobilize [their property] in such a way
that it cannot be sold or made the subject of gift or inheritance, and dis-
tribute the revenues among the poor."' 70 Subsequently, wakfs are used
to maintain public charities or "side step the strict scheme of succession
prescribed by the Shari'a that often left a testator unable to make the
adequate provisions for his surviving family."171 In a wakf, the "muta-
walli" acts in a similar fashion to the commonlaw trustee "to take
charge of the property, maintain it, pay taxes and collect rent, but he
cannot alienate the land."172 Hindu law also places a high value on the
163. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 6, at 151.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Leslie, supra note 144, at 11.
167. Id. at 411 (citing MAURICE SHELDON AMOS, AMOS AND WALTON'S INTRODUCTION
TO FRENCH LAW 82 (1963)).
168. Id. at 411 (citing AMOS, supra note 167, at 84).
169. Id. (citing AMOS, supra note 167).
170. Id. at 413 (citing 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 109 (R.
David et al eds., 1972)).
171. Leslie, supra note 144, at 413.
172. Id.
VOL. 26:3
1998 POST TRUSTEESHIP ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY 427
maintenance of trusts. Violations of trusts in Hindu legal culture called
for the severest of sanctions and punishments.' 73 In African customary
law, the chief acted as trustee over the land that his people dwelled
on.' 74 Moreover, the chief "could not alienate any part of the tribal ter-
ritory without the consent or [sic] the people nor could he even make
grants or perpetual loans without the approval of the public assem-
bly."1 75
Thus, there is evidence that the enforceability of a trust, or legal
devices that are akin to commonlaw trusts, is something that has been
accepted and implemented in several legal cultures. There is a definite
recognition that a party entrusted with a trust has a strong and sub-
stantive duty to the beneficiaries of that trust. Moreover, violations of
the duty to that trust are severely punished in some legal cultures. It is
apparent that the fiduciary relationship exists between the current
trustee and the beneficiary. However, it is unclear whether a fiduciary
relationship exists between the trustee of a trust and the descendants of
the beneficiaries of the trust. In the case of the PCB contamination in
the Marshall Islands, it can be argued that the abandonment of the
transformers was, not a violation of the fiduciary duty in a self dealing
sense, but an example of mismanagement of the trust. Thus, it can be
argued that equity demands that the obligations of the trustee cannot
terminate until the body of the trust is rehabilitated to a condition be-
fore the contamination that resulted from the trustee's administration.
IX. INTERNATIONAL EQUITY ARGUMENTS
It can be argued that as a matter of intergenerational equity, the
United States's duties should be extended to entail the clean up of the
PCB contamination. Intergenerational equity is a principle developed
by Edith Weiss Brown in "the Conservation of Equality Principle." It
states that:
[e]ach generation should maintain the quality of the planet so that it is
passed on in no worse condition than the generation received it, and
each generation is entitled to an environmental quality comparable to
that enjoyed by previous generations. 176
In the case of the Marshall Islands, the United States should have
173. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 6, at 152.
174. Id. at 151.
175. Id.
176. Lawrence E. Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy, Negotiating More Effective
Global Agreements, 54 (1994) (citing EDITH WEISS BROWN, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE
GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL
EQUITY (1989)).
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maintained the quality of the trust so that when it was returned to the
Marshallese, they would be able to enjoy a comparable degree of envi-
ronmental quality to that of their ancestors. In this case, they could
not. First, the United States had irradiated a number of the Marshal-
lese atolls during the hydrogen bomb experiments in the 50's and sec-
ond, because of the abandonment of PCB leaking transformers on the
atolls. In the latter case, the United States should be required to take
action, pursuant to its acceptance of the sacred trust, to remediate the
PCB contaminated lands.
The harm done to the Marshall Islands by the PCB leaking trans-
formers of such a nature that it is uncertain whether the Marshallese
will ever be able to use those lands as they once had. Moreover, it is
uncertain whether those Marshallese who have absorbed PCBs into
their bodies will ever be the same. The greater tragedy is that the bio-
logical impacts of the PCBs will not be felt by the generation that first
absorbed into their bodies, but the following generation. Thus, it is to
them, this faceless next generation, that the United States owes a duty
to rehabilitate the ancestral lands of the Marshallese people.
The existence of this duty to the following generations of the bene-
ficiaries of the trust has been stated and echoed implicitly in several in-
ternational agreements. In 1972 the United Nations declared in Prin-
ciple One of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
that, "[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and ade-
quate conditions of life, an environment of a quality that permits a life
of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to pro-
tect and improve the environment for present and future genera-
tions."1
7 7
The United States is bound by the Stockholm Declaration's lan-
guage requiring parties "to protect and improve the environment for
present and future generations."' 178 By denying its responsibility to re-
habilitate the PCB contaminated lands, the United States will have
failed in its duty as a steward to the next generation of Marshallese.
X. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
More recently, similar sentiments were expressed at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development ("UNCED") in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992. More specifically, one of the key provi-
sions of UNCED was expressed in Principle 2 where states agreed to
ensure that "activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
177. Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment from the U.N. Confer-
ence in Stockholm, Sweden U.N. Doc. AICONF,48114, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
178. Id.
VOL. 26:3
1998 POST TRUSTEESHIP ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY 429
damage to the environment of other States."' 79 In this case, the United
States government brought the transformers to the Trust Territory
with the intention of developing an energy infra structure there. It is
unclear whether they were brought to the Trust Territory at a time
when people were aware of the harm that PCBs caused. It is apparent
that the transformers were brought to the Trust territory for the benefit
of the local population. The area of contention can properly be focused
on the disposal of the transformers after their use. Apparently, a num-
ber of these were simply abandoned and have been discovered only
within the last decade. It is the Trust Territory government's disposal
practices with these transformers that have led to the potential prob-
lems the Marshallese and other former Trust Territory nations may
face. The decision to bring the transformers to the Marshall Islands was
clearly within the jurisdiction of the United States government. Fur-
thermore, the United States was the generator and the arranger for the
delivery of these problematic substances to the Marshall Islands. Were
these activities to have taken place in the United States with the same
resulting harm, the United States government, or the agency in charge
of these activities, would have been liable for the costs of clean up under
section 120 on Federal facilities liability of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response Compensation and Liability Act. 8 0 At the time
some of these problematic transformers were brought to the Marshall
Islands, no official action by the Trust Territory government could have
occurred without some degree of approval from the United States De-
partment of Interior. Therefore, the United States can be argued to be
legally obligated to rehabilitate those PCB contaminated lands. As a
matter of equity, the United States, as the former steward of those is-
lands, can be said to have a continuing duty to return those islands to
its people in the state they were in before the trusteeship began. Thus,
the fiduciary obligations of the trusteeship should endure until those
contaminated lands are rehabilitated.
The International Court of Justice has acknowledged the existence
of equity as a legal concept and that it "is a direct emanation of the
idea of justice. The Court whose task is by definition to administer jus-
tice is bound to apply it."181 Therefore, future generations may be able
"to point a finger at the period of administration under the partner gov-
ernments as a period when the rights of generations of [Marshallese]
were jeopardised [sic] for the sake of the immediate advantage of the
trustees."'18 2 Thus, it can be argued that the United States should be
179. United Nations Conference on Environment & Development: Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874
(1992).
180. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 9620.
181. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 6, at 338.
182. Id.
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required to rehabilitate the PCB contaminated lands as a matter of eq-
uity.
XI. INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM
A. General
It remains to be seen whether there is a basis in customary law to
obligate the United States to rehabilitate these lands. The first steps in
the establishment of international legal precedent where former Trus-
tees accept accountability for ecological harm done to the Trust Terri-
tory during the Trusteeship period may have been established in the
1986 Compact of Free Associations Provisions on the hydrogen bomb
experiments of the 50's and in the recent Australia -Nauru Settlement.
In determining whether these acts do indeed establish international le-
gal precedent, requires an examination of whether there is
a point of legislative or expository behavior [that] crystallize[s] into a
customary rule which states feel bound to follow themselves s and
which they wish to see applied to other states. This involves the recog-
nition that a state is acquiescing in the practice (state practice) and
has accepted the particular practice on the basis of a legal obligation
(opinio juris) and not merely of comity or goodwill to other states.18 3
Furthermore, there is a requirement of repetition of act for there to
be a basis for the establishment of custom.18 4 However this notion has
begun to change and the emphasis on repetition has shifted to "the
number of states taking part in a practice."18 5 Thus acknowledging
that:
[t]he number of state taking part in a practice is much more important
than the number of separate acts of which the practice is composed, or
the time over which it is spread; a single act involving fifty States pro-
vides stronger proof that a custom is accepted by the international
community than ten separate acts involving ten separate pairs of
States. 8 6
183. James Cameron, The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law,
in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 262 (Tim O'Riordan & James Cameron
eds., 1994).
184. MICHAEL AKEHURST, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (1976).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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B. The Beginning of Custom with the Nuclear Settlement
The very first steps in the establishment of a body of international
customary law that requires trustees to be accountable for ecological
harm during their stewardship may have been taken with the Compact
of Free Association between the United States and the inhabitants of
the former trust territories. While the Marshallese may never be put
back in the situation had the United States never detonated hydrogen
bombs on their lands, the United States has made an attempt to finan-
cially compensate them for past harm. In Section 177 of the Compact of
Free Association, it states that:
[T]he Government of the United States accepts the responsibility for
compensation owing to citizens of the Marshall Islands, or the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia (or Palau) for loss or damage to property and
person of the citizens of the Marshall Islands, or the Federated States
of Micronesia, resulting from the nuclear testing program which the
Government of the United States conducted in the Northern Marshall
Islands between June 30, 1946 and August 18, 1958.187
In doing so, the United States agreed to establish a multi million
dollar fund to pay financial compensation to those parties who claimed
injury as a result of the nuclear testing program.188 Furthermore, the
United States agreed, at the request of the Government of the Marshall
Islands, "to provide special medical care and logistical support thereto
for the remaining 174 members of the population of Rongelap and Utrik
who were exposed to radiation resulting from "Bravo" test."1 8 9 In the
specific case of Rongelap, the United States has agreed to, "take such
steps (if any) as may be necessary to overcome the effects of such fallout
[from a 1954 thermonuclear test] on the habitability of Rongelap Island,
and to restore Rongelap Island, if necessary, so that it can be safely be
inhabited."'90 However, section 177(i)(1) does begin with the phrase "be-
cause the Rongelap people remain unconvinced that it is safe to con-
tinue to live on Rongelap Island,"' 91 and every required action is a
187. Id. at § 177.
188.
In approving the Compact, the Congress understands and intends that the
peoples of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utrik, who were affected by the
United States nuclear weapons testing program in the Marshall Islands, will
receive the amounts of $75,000,000 (Bikini); $48,750,000 (Enewetak),
$37,500,000 (Rongelap) and $22,500,000 (Utrik), respectively, which
amounts shall be paid out of proceeds from the funds established [under
other articles of the Compact of Free association].
Id. at § 177(a).
189. Id. at § 177(h)(1)
190. Id. at § 177 (i)(1).
191. Id.
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qualified one (contingent on a review of findings of habitability), there
appears to be a patronizing air to the language of this specific provision
to the Marshallese living on Rongelap. Ultimately, the United States
has accepted some measure of accountability for the harm done and has
taken steps to begin to remediate the situation.
C. Nauru v. Australia Settlement
Recently, the Island nation of the Republic of Nauru brought a law-
suit against Australia claiming that "it suffered damage as a result of
Australia's violation of its rights under both the relevant United Na-
tions Trusteeship provisions and several general principles of interna-
tional law including self-determination, permanent sovereignty over
natural resources, and abuse of rights."192 One of Nauru's greatest
natural resources was an abundant supply of rich phosphate depos-
its.193 Due to its value as a fertilizer, Australia mined out approxi-
mately one third of the island during its administration of Nauru as a
U.N. Trusteeship. 194
The primary focus of the Republic of Nauru's suit against Australia
was that it "had suffered loss first as a result of the failure of the part-
ner governments [Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia] to reha-
bilitate the lands mined prior to [the date when Nauru gained control
over the phosphate mining industry], and second because of the manner
in which the phosphates had been exploited."'195 More specifically, the
Republic of Nauru asserted that Australia first, "abused its authority
over the territory and people of Nauru;"'196 second, "Australia violated
the solemn duties of a predecessor state that is entrusted with the task
of administering or preparing a territory whose title is to be trans-
ferred;"'9 7 and "[flinally, . . Australia violated customary international
law principles prohibiting unjust enrichment."' 198 In its claim for relief,
the Republic of Nauru "requests that the ICJ ajudge and declare that
Australia has incurred an international legal responsibility and is
bound to make restitution or other appropriate reparation to Nauru for
the damage and prejudice suffered." '199
Australia responded to the Republic of Nauru's claims with a num-
192. Anghie, supra note 4, at 445-446.
193. Id. at 446.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 453 (citing Memorial of Nauru (Nauru v. AustI.), 1990 I.C.J. 89, 309 (Apr.
1990)).
196. Id. at 462.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 463.
199. Id. (quoting Memorial of Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1989 I.C.J. 32 (May 19) (Appli-
cation Instituting Processdings)).
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ber of assertions. As a matter of jurisdiction Australia asserted that
only the UN general assembly and Trusteeship council were competent
to rule on the case and the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the mat-
ter.200As to the merits of the case, Australia's official responses to the
Republic of Nauru's claims on the matter could not be disclosed to the
public until the case had reached that phase of the adjudication. 20 1
However, based on public statements made by Australia on the matter
of rehabilitation, it can be discerned that their official position was
"that the phosphate agreement Nauruans the economic benefit of the
phosphate industry, that the partner governments gave up their mining
concession without compensation, and that as a result, Nauruans had a
means to provide for rehabilitation. " 20 2
In 1993 Australia and the Republic of Nauru settled their claims
before the International Court of Justice could rule on the matter. It is
of significant interest to note that the International Court of Justice
ruled that it did have jurisdiction to hear the case.20 3 Subsequently, it
can then be argued that the International Court of justice may also
have jurisdiction to hear a similar case in the context of toxic contami-
nation brought by former Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands against
the United States. While Nauru v. Australia was a case involving self
dealing on the part of the administering authority and thus distin-
guishable from the case of the PCB contamination of the Marshall Is-
lands, both suits sought ecological rehabilitation of lands harmed dur-
ing the trusteeship period. Had the Nauru v. Australia case been
actually litigated, historic legal precedent may have been established on
the subject of post trusteeship environmental liability.
In the settlement agreement between Australia and Nauru over
Australia's phosphate mining,204 Australia, "agreed to pay Nauru $107
million (Australian) 'in an effort to assist the Republic of Nauru in its
preparations for post phosphate future.' However the Settlement
Agreement explicitly states that the settlement payments are 'made
without prejudice to Australia's long-standing position that bears no re-
200. Id. at 464.
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing Australian Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Nauru: International
Court of Justice Action Against Australia Backgrounder, 13 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 409, 410
(1992)).
203. Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992
I.C.J. 240 (June 26).
204.
A brief look at the island [of Nauru] shows that pre-independence mining left
much of the island covered with former strip-mining sites. Because of the
nature of phosphate mining, these sites are not simply open pits, but rather
fields of rock pinnacles standing several meters high, making the mined por-
tions of the island unusuable for virtually anything.
Leslie, supra note 144, at 415.
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sponsibility for the rehabilitation of the phosphate lands."' 20 5
Despite the presence of this "no responsibility" provision, the
agreement can be viewed "as a tacit acknowledgment of some responsi-
bility by Australia for the massive environmental and economic damage
perpetrated on the island of Nauru."20 6 This settlement alone may not
signal the emergence of a new trend in international customary law,
but in the context of other agreements it may. In light of the U.S. Com-
pact of Free Association in regards to nuclear rehabilitation of hydrogen
bomb experiment lands there does appear to be a growing, albeit a re-
luctant, trend for former Trustees to take responsibility for their ac-
tions.
XII. CONCLUSION
Typically, the former Trustees have negotiated settlements with
the inhabitants of the former trusts. It can be reasonably argued that
this is done out of fear that if the merits of the case were litigated, the
case might result in official international legal precedent that officially
obligates Trustees to take responsibility for their past acts. Presently,
the former Trustees are attempting to pre-empt this type of precedent
by negotiating settlements with waivers of liability provisions in them.
However, the truth of the matter is quite apparent. The former Trus-
tees are remediating the ecological harm done under their administra-
torship out of a sense of apprehension of litigation and the potential es-
tablishment of legal precedent. Thus, this is a trend in and of itself. It
is a new trend where the negotiation of settlements entailing voluntary
remediation is indeed the beginning of a custom of former trustees ac-
cepting some accountability for ecological harm. This may be the basis
for an argument requiring the United States to rehabilitate newly dis-
covered PCB contaminated lands.
Further strengthening this argument, the express text of the U.N.
Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations
clearly state the existence of a trust relationship. The trusts were cre-
ated to help the inhabitants of the former Mandate territories, not as a
justification to exploit them. History has shown that a number of the
trustees exploited their trusts for their own economic or strategic bene-
fit. In this case, the transformers were brought to the Marshall Islands
to help the development of the Marshallese. However, the unintended
residue of energy development has been toxic PCB contamination of the
soil and waters, thus making some of the lands unusable. Until the
PCB contaminated lands are rehabilitated, the Marshallese will be de-
prived of lands that were of reasonable use before the trusteeship be-
205. Reyes, supra note 135, at 32.
206. Id.
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gan. Thus the clear language of the UN Charter, the Trusteeship
Agreements are proof of the existence of a fiduciary relationship and
equity demands that this relationship cannot end until the harm
caused during the trust is repaired.

